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Abstract
We consider a distributed information system
that allows autonomous consumers to query au-
tonomous providers. We focus on the problem
of query allocation from a new point of view,
by considering consumers and providers’ satisfac-
tion in addition to query load. We define satis-
faction as a long-run notion based on the con-
sumers and providers’ intentions. Intuitively, a
participant should obtain good satisfaction as far
as it (the participant) is adequate to the sys-
tem. We propose and validate a mediation process,
called SBMediation, which is compared to Ca-
pacity based query allocation. The experimental
results show that SBMediation significantly out-
performs Capacity based when confronted to au-
tonomous participants.
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1. Introduction
We consider a distributed information system
with a mediator that enables consumers to ac-
cess distributed information providers through
queries [10]. Participants1 are autonomous in the
sense that they are free to enter and leave the sys-
tem at will and do not depend on anyone to do
so. Then, the main function of the mediator is to
allocate each incoming query to the providers that
can answer it. Much work in this context has fo-
cused on query load balancing (QLB) [8, 15], i.e.
distributing the query load among the providers in
a way that maximizes overall performance (typi-
cally throughput and response time). This is ob-
viously important for the efficiency of the sys-
tem. However, participants may have certain ex-
pectations, w.r.t. the mediator, which are not only
performance-related.
Providers’ expectations reflect their preferences
in performing some queries rather than others. For
example, a provider pc could represent a phar-
maceutical company, which wants to promote a
new insect repellent. Thus, it is more interested
in treating the queries related to mosquitoes or
insect bites than general queries. Once the adver-
tising campaign is over, the provider’s preferences
may change. Consumers expect the mediator to
1 We refer, throughout this paper, to both consumers and
providers together as participants
provide them with information, which best fits
their preferences. However, preferences are usually
considered as private data by participants, since
revealing them means revealing strategies. Thus,
participants express their preferences via an in-
tention notion, which can combine different crite-
ria such as preferences and load. For instance, a
provider may not intend to perform queries (even
if it prefers them) because of local reasons, e.g.
by overload. Since it is autonomous, a participant
that is dissatisfied too long may just leave the me-
diator. In our context, this is equivalent to depart
from the system, but it could be that the provider
registers to another mediator. Therefore, it is quite
important to satisfy participants while allocating
queries in order to avoid having participants leave
the system by dissatisfaction. Intuitively, the sys-
tem satisfies the participants if the mediator meets
their expectations.
In this context, query allocation is a challenge
for several reasons. First, to our knowledge, there
is no definition of satisfaction to characterize how
well the system meets the participants’ expecta-
tions in the long-run. Economical models consider
utility and rationality [13], but this is not a long-
run notion. Second, participants’ expectations are
usually contradictory. Third, the query demand
should be satisfied even if sometimes consumers
and providers do not desire to deal with providers
and queries, respectively. Finally, participants’ de-
partures may have consequences on the function-
alities provided by the system. The providers’ de-
parture may mean the loss of important system
capabilities and the consumers’ departure is a loss
of queries for providers. Our main contributions in
this paper are the following.
• We define the notions of participants’ satis-
faction in a new model. Also, we define a no-
tion of system’s adequation w.r.t. participants
in order to know whether queries correspond
to participants’ expectations. The proposed
model eases the design of new mediation pro-
cesses for query allocation that satisfy partic-
ipants in allocating queries.
• We propose a query allocation mediation pro-
cess, called SBMediation, with the objec-
tive of satisfying participants by finding not
only relevant providers (i.e. interesting re-
sults) to consumers, but also finding interest-
ing queries to providers.
• We implement SBMediation and compare its
behavior to a classic query allocation process,
namely Capacity based (e.g. [8]). We mainly
study both processes from a satisfaction point
of view, and analyze the impact on perfor-
mance of the participants’ autonomy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Af-
ter giving the motivation and focus of this paper
at the remainder of this section, we give some pre-
liminary concepts in Section 2. Section 3 presents
the model that characterizes participants’ expec-
tations. In Section 4, we define a mediation pro-
cess to allocate queries by considering the par-
ticipants’ intentions and providers’ satisfaction,
called SBMediation. We validate the proposed
mediation in Section 5. In Section 6, we survey
related work. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
1.1. Example Scenario
Consider a distributed information system
gathering thousands of computer sites (such as
schools, home users, students, and professors) with
the aim of sharing information and computational
resources, as in the Grid4All project [1]. Each site
preserves its preferences for allocating and per-
forming queries. For example, a family can offer
its personal computational resources to be used
by their children’s college during class hours. How-
ever, even if they accept different class activities,
they prefer those related to their children’s class
with a particular attention to the physics class
project that needs a lot of computer resources to
run simulations. Such contributors appreciate to
know how their computer resources are used by
who and to do what. It is up to the college to man-
age the different resources proposed by different
persons with different preferences to run college’s
projects and make contributors globally satisfied
with the use of their materials. Another example
could be universities desiring to share their infor-
Table 1: Relevant providers to perform sx’s query.
Providers Pro. Intention Con. Intention
p2 Yes No
p4 No Yes
p1 Yes No
p3 No Yes
p5 Yes Yes
mation and resources preferably with some com-
munities for particular purposes.
An example scenario in Grid4All may be a stu-
dent sx that desires to perform a specific applica-
tion. She requests the system for 2 sites providing
computational resources, e.g. CPU ’s time units,
to deploy her distributed application. Since she
needs some guidelines on how to present her re-
port on this activity, she also requests the system
for 3 answers from different sources to obtain some
advice.
For both previous queries, the system must per-
form several tasks. First, it must find the sites that
are able to deal with sx’s query (i.e. identify the
relevant providers). There is a large body of work
on matchmaking, see e.g. [7, 9] which we could
simply reuse. Then, the system needs to select the
required number of providers among relevant ones.
If possible, it is best to select providers with least
load and short answering time such that sx’s and
providers’ preferences are enforced. Let us assume
that the mediator is able to obtain the load of the
relevant providers. Assume, then, that p2, p4, p1,
p3, and p5 is the resulting list, ordered from the
least to the most loaded (Table 1). Then, the medi-
ator should obtain sx’s interests to deal with such
providers and the providers’ interests to deal with
sx’s query. Consider that p3 and p4 do not desire
to deal with sx’s query because, for instance, p3 is
already in competition with sx (and does not want
to help her) and p4 is already loaded and prefers to
treat other kinds of query. Similarly, consider that
sx does not desire to deal with p1 and p2 since her
last experiences with them were not so good, and
that p5 is overloaded.
Given this context, there are several ways to
allocate the query to the number of providers re-
quired by the consumer. One can allocate it from
the providers’ load point of view only, as QLB
methods do. In this case, the participants’ expec-
tations may not be met. In the above scenario al-
though p2 and p4 are the less loaded, allocating
the query to these providers may dissatisfy them
because neither sx desires to allocate its query to
p2 nor p4 intends to deal with sx’s query. Another
way to allocate queries is to consider all the par-
ticipants expectations and try to satisfy them as
much as possible. However, as shown by the sce-
nario, it may also happen that the allocation of
some query does not satisfy some participants or
even none of them. In our view, this is not a prob-
lem as long as query allocation meets the partici-
pants’ expectations in the long run: they may be
dissatisfied sometimes but still “globally” satisfied
“in the long run”.
1.2. Focus of the Paper
To our knowledge, no model enables the study
of the participants’ long run satisfaction in a sys-
tem. In particular, QLB models fail to do so be-
cause they only consider load. Thus, the problem
is not only to define query allocation mechanisms
with the objective to ensure the participants satis-
faction but also, especially, to define a new model
that also considers the participants long run sat-
isfaction. This model should enable to evaluate a
given allocation process.
Hence, in this paper, the problem that we con-
sider is twofold. As for the model definition, we
focus on two main points. First, we want to inves-
tigate both notions of satisfaction and adequation
of a participant w.r.t. the system. These notions
are closely related, as for example, a provider of
medical information does not fit in a system deal-
ing with geology, and thus will obviously be dis-
satisfied by the queries it gets. Second, we aim at
defining both local and global characterizations.
Local characterization enables each participant to
evaluate itself in the system and global characteri-
zation evaluates the query allocation process itself.
As for a query allocation process, we focus on a
mechanism in which the providers have to bid on
queries, while the consumers directly show their
intentions to the mediator. The problem here is
not only to define the mechanism but also to pro-
pose a possible bidding strategy for the providers,
as well as the flow of money (which is virtual) in
the system. Last but not least, we focus on the
validation of the proposed query allocation pro-
cess through the proposed model.
2. Preliminary Concepts
The system consists of a mediator,m, of a set of
consumers, C, and of a set of providers, P . These
sets are not necessary disjoint, i.e. a participant
may play different roles. Providers can be hetero-
geneous in terms of capacity and data. Hetero-
geneous capacity means that some providers are
more powerful than others and can treat more
queries per time unit. In our context, data het-
erogeneity means that providers provide different
data and thus produce different results for a same
query.
Queries are formulated in a format abstracted
as a triple q = < c, d, n > such that q.c ∈ C is
the identifier of the consumer that has issued the
query, q.d is the description of the query to be
done, and q.n ∈ N∗ is the number of providers to
which the consumer wishes to allocate its query.
Consumers send their queries to mediator m that
allocates each incoming query q to q.n providers.
The set Pq denotes the set of providers that can
treat the query q and are registered to a media-
tor m, which does not appear in the notation for
simplicity. In the case where q.n > ||Pq||, the con-
sumer q.c gets ||Pq|| results instead of q.n. In other
words, if the number of providers that are able to
deal with a query is smaller or equal than the num-
ber desired by the consumer, all these providers
must perform the query.
The allocation of some query q is denoted by
a vector All−→oc of length N , or All−→ocq and Nq if
there is an ambiguity on q, such that,
∀p ∈ Pq, All
−→oc [p] =
1 if p gets the query
0 otherwise
As we assume any incoming query should be
treated if possible, this leads to
∑
p∈Pq
All−→oc [p] =
min(q.n, Nq). Notice that, without any loss of
generality, in some cases (e.g. when consumers
pay services with real money) the query allocation
means that providers are selected for participating
in a negotiation process with consumers.
Each provider p ∈ P has a finite capacity,
capp > 0, for performing queries. The capacity of
a provider denotes the number of computational
units that it can have. Similarly, each query q has
a cost, costp(q) > 0, that represents the computa-
tional units that q consumes at p. Let Qp denote
the set of requests that have been allocated to p
but have not already been treated at time t (i.e.
the pending requests at p). We then say that the
utilization of a provider p ∈ P at time t, denoted
by Up(t), is
Up(t) =
∑
q∈Qp
costp(q)
capp
Participants express their preferences to allo-
cate and perform queries via an intention value.
The way in which participants compute their in-
tentions is considered as private information (e.g.
in an e-commerce scenario, enterprises do not re-
veal their business strategies). However, even if it
is private, the way in which participants compute
their intentions has a direct impact on the sys-
tem’s behavior. For instance, if participants are
interested in system’s performance, the end result
is that the system has high performance.
3. Participants Characterization
We are interested in two characteristics of par-
ticipants that show how they perceive the sys-
tem in which they interact. The first one is ad-
equation. From a general point of view, two kinds
of adequation could be considered: (i) the sys-
tem’s adequation to a participant, e.g. a system
where a provider cannot find any query it in-
tends to perform is considered inadequate to such
a provider (the System-Provider Adequation); and
(ii) the participant’s adequation to the system,
e.g. a consumer issuing queries that no provider in-
tends to treat is considered inadequate to the sys-
tem (the Consumer-System Adequation). Through
these notions, we can evaluate if it is possible for
a participant to reach its goals in the system. A
participant cannot know what other participants
think about it, except if it has a global knowledge
of the system. Therefore, we consider the partici-
pant’s adequation to the system as a global char-
acteristic (see Section 3.3).
The second characteristic is satisfaction. As for
adequation, two kinds of satisfaction could be con-
sidered: (i) the satisfaction of a participant with
what it gets from the system, e.g. a consumer
that receives results from the providers it wants to
avoid is simply not satisfied (the Consumer Sat-
isfaction); and (ii) the participant’s satisfaction
with the job that the query allocation method does
for it, e.g. a provider that performs queries it does
not want is not satisfied with the query alloca-
tion method if there exist queries of its interests
that it does not get (the Provider Allocation Sat-
isfaction). Both satisfaction notions may have a
deep impact on the system, because participants
may decide whether to stay or to leave the system
based on them.
Besides the adequation and satisfaction of a
participant, we are interested in two other global
characteristics: (i) the query allocation efficiency
w.r.t. a consumer and (ii) the query allocation ef-
ficiency w.r.t. a provider. These new global char-
acteristics allow evaluating if the query allocation
method really does a good job for a participant.
We assume that participants have a limited
memory capacity and regularly assess only their
k last interactions with the system. Notice that
the k value may be different for each participant
depending on its memory capacity, but also on its
strategy. For simplicity, we assume that they all
use the same value of k. Thus, we define the char-
acteristics of the participants over their k last in-
teractions.
Before going further, let us make two general re-
marks. First, the participant’s characteristics may
evolve with time, but for the sake of simplicity,
we do not introduce time in our notations. Sec-
ond, the following presentation is completely sym-
metrical for the participants’ dynamic data (inten-
tions) as well as for their static data (e.g. the pref-
erences). However, applying the following char-
acterization to intentions and preferences yields
to different results, because intentions of partici-
pants consider their context (such as their strat-
egy and utilization) and their preferences do not.
While in almost all distributed information sys-
tems preferences tend to be private information,
intentions tend to be public. For simplicity, we
develop the following characteristics only for pref-
erences, whose values are in [−1..1].
3.1. Local Consumer Characterization
We characterize a consumer according to the in-
formation that it can obtain from the system. Intu-
itively, the consumer’s characteristics are useful to
answer the following questions: “How well the con-
sumer’s expectations correspond to the providers
that were able to deal with its last queries?” –
System-Consumer Adequation – ; “How far the
providers that have dealt with the last queries
of a consumer meet its expectations?” – Con-
sumer Satisfaction – ; and “Is a consumer satisfied
with the allocation process?” – Consumer Alloca-
tion Satisfaction –. All these notions are based on
the memory of a consumer, which is denoted by
IQkc . The preference of a consumer c to allocate
its query q to a provider p is given by function
Prf
q
c (p).
3.1.1. Adequation
The system’s adequation to a consumer character-
izes the perception that a consumer has from the
system. In our example scenario of Section 1.1,
we can say that the system is quite adequate to
sx since it contains providers that sx considers in-
teresting. Formally, the system’s adequation w.r.t.
a consumer c ∈ C concerning a query q, denoted
by δsca(c, q), is defined as the average of c’s prefer-
ences towards the set Pq of providers (Equation 1).
Its values are in the interval [0..1].
δsca(c, q) =
(( 1
||Pq||
∑
p∈Pq
Prf qc (p)
)
+ 1
)/
2 (1)
We thus define the system’s adequation to a con-
sumer as the average over the adequations con-
cerning its k last queries.
Definition 1 System-Consumer Adequation
δsca(c) =
1
||IQkc ||
∑
q∈IQkc
δsca(c, q)
Its values are between 0 and 1. The closer the δsca
value to 1, the more a consumer considers the sys-
tem as adequate.
3.1.2. Satisfaction
The satisfaction w.r.t. a consumer c ∈ C concern-
ing a query q, denoted by δs(c, q), is related to
those providers that performed q (denoted by the
set P̂q). The average of preferences expressed by
the providers in P̂q is an intuitive technique to
define such a notion. Nevertheless, a simple av-
erage does not take into account the fact that a
consumer may desire different results. Let us il-
lustrate this using our example scenario presented
in Section 1.1. If the system allocated sx’s query
only to p4, for which sx has a preference of e.g.
1, then sx would be considered as completely sat-
isfied (i.e. with a satisfaction of 1) even if he did
not receive the number of results she desired. The
following equation takes into account of this point
using n instead of ||P̂q||.
δs(c, q) =
(( 1
n
∑
p∈cPq
Prf qc (p)
)
+ 1
)/
2 (2)
where n stands for q.n. The δs(c, q) values are in
the interval [0..1]. The satisfaction of a consumer
is then defined as the average over its obtained
satisfactions concerning its k last queries.
Definition 2 Consumer Satisfaction
δs(c) =
1
||IQkc ||
∑
q∈IQkc
δs(c, q)
Its values are between 0 and 1. The closer the sat-
isfaction to 1, the more a consumer is satisfied.
This notion of satisfaction does not consider the
context. Then, it does not allow a consumer to
evaluate the efforts made by the query allocation
method to satisfy it. For example, assume that,
in scenario of Section 1.1, sx has a preference of
1, .9, and .7 for allocating her query to p4, p3,
and p5, respectively. Now, suppose the system al-
locates the query to p3. This corresponds to sx’s
high preferences, so sx is quite satisfied. However,
there is still a provider for which her preference
is higher: p4. The notion of Consumer Allocation
Satisfaction, denoted by δas(c), allows a consumer
to evaluate how well the query allocation method
works for it. Its values are in the interval [0..∞].
Definition 3 Consumer Allocation Satisfaction
δas(c) =
1
||IQkc ||
∑
q∈IQkc
δs(c, q)
δsca(c, q)
If the obtained value is greater than 1, the con-
sumer can conclude that the query allocation
method acts to its favor. However, if the value is
smaller than 1, the query allocation method dis-
satisfies the consumer. Finally, a value equal to 1
means that the query allocation method is neu-
tral.
3.2. Local Provider Characterization
This section is devoted to the characterization
of a provider. Intuitively, we strive to answer the
following questions: “How well the expectations of
a provider correspond to the last queries that have
been proposed to it?” – System-Provider Adequa-
tion – ; “How well the last queries that a provider
has treated meet its expectations?” – Provider
Satisfaction – ; and “Is a provider satisfied with
the allocation process?” – Provider Allocation Sat-
isfaction –. To define these characteristics, each
provider tracks its shown preferences to perform
the k last proposed queries into vector P
−→
rfp. The
k last proposed queries to a provider p are denoted
by vector PQkp.
3.2.1. Adequation
The system’s adequation to a provider helps this
provider to evaluate if the system corresponds to
its expectations. For example, in the scenario of
Section 1.1, one can consider the system as ade-
quate to p2, p1, and p5, because sx’s query is of
their interest. However, it is difficult to conclude
by considering only one query. An average over the
k last interactions is more informative.
Definition 4 System-Provider Adequation
δspa(p) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(( 1
||PQkp||
∑
q∈PQkp
P
−→
rfp[q]
)
+ 1
)/
2
0 if PQkp = ∅
The values that this adequation can take are in
the interval [0..1]. The closer the value to 1, the
greater the adequation of the system to a provider.
3.2.2. Satisfaction
Conversely to the adequation notion, the satisfac-
tion of a provider only depends on the queries that
it performs and is independent of the other queries
that the system has proposed to it. In the scenario
of Section 1.1, assume that the system allocates
sx’s query to p4. In this query allocation, p4 is not
satisfied since it did not desire to deal with such a
query. Nonetheless, considering a query allocation
alone is not very meaningful for a provider. What
is more important for a provider is to be globally
satisfied with the queries it performs. Thus, we de-
fine the Provider Satisfaction of a provider p ∈ P ,
δs(p) in Definition 5. Set SQ
k
p (SQ
k
p ⊆ PQ
k
p) de-
notes the set of queries that provider p performed
among set PQkp. The δs(p) values are between 0
and 1. The closer the value to 1, the greater the
satisfaction of a provider.
Definition 5 Provider Satisfaction
δs(p) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(( 1
||SQkp||
∑
q∈SQkp
P
−→
rfp[q]
)
+ 1
)/
2
0 if SQkp = ∅
On the one hand, the provider’s satisfaction
evaluates whether the system is giving queries to
a provider that enable it to fulfill its objectives.
On the other hand, a provider may also be in-
terested in the efforts that the query allocation
method makes to satisfy it. Conversely to a con-
sumer that always receives results at each interac-
tion, a provider is not allocated all the proposed
queries. Hence, a provider cannot evaluate the job
that the query allocation method does for it at
each interaction. We then formally define this no-
tion w.r.t. a provider p ∈ P , denoted by δas(p), as
the ratio of its Satisfaction to its system-provider
adequation. Its values are between 0 and ∞.
Definition 6 Provider Allocation Satisfaction
δas(p) =
δs(p)
δspa(p)
If the allocation satisfaction of a provider p is
greater than 1, the query allocation method works
well for p. If the value is smaller than 1, the closer
it is to zero, the more p is dissatisfied with the
query allocation method. Finally, a value equal to
1 means the query allocation method is neutral.
3.3. Global Characterization
Conversely to the local characteristics of a par-
ticipant (Sections 3.1 and 3.2), the characteristics
we define here can be only applied to public data.
So, in almost all cases, these characteristics are
just applied to the participants’ intentions. How-
ever, to preserve an homogeneity of presentation
with respect to local characteristics, we develop
the following characteristics for the static data,
i.e. for preferences. While the local characteristics
evaluate the query allocation method regarding
the perception of a participant, the global charac-
teristics evaluate objectively the query allocation
method. The goal is to answer the following ques-
tions: “How well the last queries of a consumer
correspond to the expectations of the providers
that were able to deal with?” – Consumer-System
Adequation – ; “How well a provider correspond to
the consumer’s expectations?” – Provider-System
Adequation – and; “How well the query allocation
method performs with respect to a consumer or
a provider?” – Query Allocation Efficiency w.r.t.
a Consumer – Query Allocation Efficiency w.r.t.
a Provider – , respectively. To do so, we have to
know how much a participant is adequate to the
system.
The adequation of a consumer to the system
enables it to evaluate how much providers are in-
terested in its queries. Going back to scenario of
Section 1.1, we can say that sx’s query is adequate
to the system since great part of providers desire
to treat it. According to this intuition, the adequa-
tion of a consumer c ∈ C to the system concerning
its interaction with the system for allocating its
query q, noted δcsa(c, q), is defined as the average
of the preferences shown by set Pq of providers
towards its query q (Equation 3). Its values are
between 0 and 1.
δcsa(c, q) =
(( 1
||Pq||
∑
p∈Pq
P
−→
rfp[q]
)
+ 1
)/
2 (3)
Thus, we define the consumer’s adequation to the
system as the average over the δcsa values obtained
in its k last queries.
Definition 7 Consumer-System Adequation
δcsa(c) =
1
||IQkc ||
∑
q∈IQkc
δcsa(c, q)
Its values are between 0 and 1. The closer the
δcsa value to 1, the greater the adequation of
a consumer to the system. Having defined δcsa,
the query allocation efficiency w.r.t. a consumer
c ∈ C, δae(c), is defined in Definition 8. Its values
are between 0 and ∞.
Definition 8 Query Allocation Efficiency w.r.t. a
Consumer
δae(c) =
1
||IQkc ||
∑
q∈IQkc
δs(c, q)
δsca(c, q) · δcsa(c, q)
On the one hand, the query allocation effi-
ciency w.r.t. a consumer allows to evaluate, as
objectively as possible, how well the query al-
location method works for a consumer. On the
other hand, the query allocation efficiency w.r.t.
a provider (Definition 10) allows to evaluate
whether the query allocation method strives to
satisfy a provider or not. To define this latter no-
tion, as for a consumer, we have to know how much
a provider is adequate to the system.
The adequation of a provider to the system
allows it to evaluate if consumers are interested
in interacting with it. To illustrate the Provider-
System Adequation, we use the scenario of Sec-
tion 1.1. One may consider p1 and p2 as inadequate
to the system since sx does not want to deal with.
Nevertheless, the most important is to evaluate
this over the set PQkp of queries. So, we define the
adequation of a provider p ∈ P to the system, de-
noted by δpsa(p), over the k last proposed queries
(Definition 9). Its values are in [0..1]. The closer
the δpsa(p) value to 1, the greater the adequation
of a provider to the system.
Definition 9 Provider-System Adequation
δpsa(p) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(( 1
||PQkp||
∑
q∈PQkp
P
−→
rf qc[p]
)
+ 1
)/
2
0 if PQkp = ∅
We then define the query allocation efficiency
with respect to a provider p ∈ P , δae(p), as the ra-
tio of its satisfaction to the product of its system-
provider adequation by its provider-system ade-
quation. Its values are in [0..∞].
Definition 10 Query Allocation Efficiency w.r.t.
a Provider
δae(p) =
δs(p)
δspa(p) · δpsa(p)
If the value of the query allocation efficiency with
respect to a participant (consumer or provider) is
greater than 1, the query allocation method does a
good job for a given consumer, or else, if the value
is smaller than 1, a given consumer is dissatisfied
with the query allocation method. In the case the
value is 1, the query allocation method is quite
neutral to a given consumer.
4. Satisfaction Balanced Mediation
In this section, we define a particular query al-
location process that takes into account both the
consumers’ and providers’ intentions. Anticipat-
ing the validation section, we call it Satisfaction
Balanced Mediation (SBMediation). The process
assumes that the consumers in the system show
their intentions, denoted by vector
−→
CI , to the me-
diator, while the providers keep them private. In-
stead, providers bid on queries, which is a means
to reflect their intentions while keeping them pri-
vate. We focus on three main points: (i) the defini-
tion of the process itself, (ii) the providers’ bidding
strategies, and (iii) the money flow in the system.
4.1. Definition of the Process
Let us consider the allocation of some query q
initiated by some consumer c ∈ C. The providers
in Pq bid on q. Providers’ bid are only public to
the mediator and other participants cannot know
such values. Bids are represented by a vector
−→
B ,
with
−→
B [p] ∈ R for all p ∈ Pq. If a bid is pos-
itive, the higher the it is, the more p wants to
be allocated q. If it is negative, the lower it is
the less p wants to treat q. Intuitively, provider
p’s bid reflects p’s intention to perform q. This
should lead to the providers’ satisfaction. How-
ever, if only bids are considered, the consumer
may be dissatisfied either because its intentions
with respect to providers are not considered (when
it gets answers from providers it doesn’t want)
or because some queries are not performed (be-
cause no provider wants to treat them). Hence, to
satisfy the consumer, SBMediation: (i) directly
considers the consumer’s intentions (
−→
CI ); (ii) im-
poses the query when not enough providers want
to perform it [16]. Processing SBMediation for
some query q, amounts to computing (i) All−→ocq
(Section 2), and (ii) T−−→ransq , which defines all
the “monetary” transfers that occur among the
providers in Pq. In both steps, consumer’s inten-
tions and bids have to be balanced to ensure both
consumer’s and providers’ satisfaction.
4.1.1. Query allocation
Query q is allocated to the min(n,Nq) “best”
providers, which are given by vector of ranking
−→
R . Intuitively,
−→
R [1] = p iff p is the best ranked,
−→
R [2] stands for the second best ranked and so
on. Hence, All−→ocq[p] = 1 iff ∃i,
−→
R [i] = p and
i ≤ min(Nq, n). Vector
−→
R is computed with the
providers’ levels
−→
L (Definition 11).
Definition 11 Vector of providers’ levels
∀p ∈ Pq, with ω ∈ [0..1],
−→
L [p] =
˛˛
˛˛
˛
(
−→
B [p] + 1)ω × (
−→
CIq[p] + 1)
1−ω if
−→
B [p] ≥ 0
−(−
−→
B [p] + 1)ω × (
−→
CIq[p] + 1)
ω−1 otherwise
Parameter ω reflects the relative importance
the mediator gives to the consumer’s intentions
or the providers’ bids (which themselves reflect
Table 2: SBMediation: a competition case
ω = 0.5 ; n = 2
the providers’ intentions). If ω = 0, only the con-
sumer’s intentions are considered, thus leading to
providers dissatisfaction. Conversely, if ω = 1,
only bids are considered, leading to consumers dis-
satisfaction. Thus, the mediator should set param-
eter ω according to the balance between both con-
sumers’ and providers’ satisfaction that it wants
to reach. Table 2 shows the case of a competi-
tion. The consumer asks for two providers, and
more than two bid positively. Providers p5 and p3
are allocated the query because they get the two
highest levels, respectively 2.28 and 2.24. Notice
that the consumer’s intention with respect to p5
is lower than its intention with respect to p3. So,
p5 only got the query because of its bid (2.25)
which is higher than p3’s bid (1.79), meaning that
it wanted the query more than p3. Table 3 shows
an imposition case where no provider but p4 wants
to treat the query, whereas the consumer asks for
two providers. Provider p5 is imposed the query
because of both its bid (which is the highest neg-
ative bid) and the consumer’s intention with re-
spect to it, which leads to the value 1.47 of its
level.
4.1.2. Monetary transfers
Bids cannot be directly compared, because of the
provider’s intentions. To overcome this difficulty,
the theoretical bid (
−→
B Th(p, l)) corresponds to the
amount that p should bid for reaching level l. With
ω 6= 0 and α = 1 if l ≥ 0, and α = −1 otherwise,
−→
B Th(p, l) is given by the following formula.
−→
B
Th(p, l) = αmax(((α×l)
1
ω (
−→
CIq[p]+1)
α(ω−1)
ω −1), 0) (4)
For example, in Table 2, we have already noticed
that provider p5 gets a level slightly higher than
p3’s, because of its higher bid and despite the lower
consumer’s intention. In fact, to come exactly to
p3’s level, p5 should bid 2.136 (theoretical bid).
Given a provider p′,
−−→
PTr[p, p′] denotes what p′
owes due to the allocation of q to p (
−−→
PTr[p, p′] = 0
if p is not allocated q). Then, the total amount
paid by p′ is defined by a sum (Formula 5).
∀p′ ∈ Pq, T
−−→rans[p
′] =
∑
p∈Pq
−−→
PTr[p, p′] (5)
There is a competition when there are enough
providers that want to be allocated the query. In
that case, each of them pays the amount of its the-
oretical bid to reach the level of the best provider
which has not been selected (in the spirit of a
generalized Vickrey auction [18] except that the
consumer’s intention is considered). In Table 2,
only providers p5 and p3 pay (respectively 2.09
and 1.75) to the mediator, thus decreasing their
own money balance (bal). A requisition case oc-
curs when at least one provider is imposed the
query. Obviously, being imposed does not meet at
all the expectations of the ni imposed providers
(ni stands for the number of imposed providers).
Hence, to keep them satisfied in the long run, the
idea is then to distribute the cost of the imposi-
tion on all the providers in Pq (in the spirit of [16]
considering the consumer’s intentions too). Hav-
ing obtained a reward, the ni imposed providers
are more likely, in the future, to obtain the queries
they expect (because they have more money) so
leading to their satisfaction. The formal defini-
tions of the transfers in the imposition case are:
Definition 12 Partial transfers in a requisition
case
If provider p is allocated q and
−→
B [p] < 0, then for
all p′ ∈ Pq:
−−→
PTr[p, p′] =
˛˛
˛˛
˛˛
˛˛
˛˛
−
−→
B Th(p,
−→
L [
−→
R [min(n+ 2, N)]])
N
ifp 6= p′
−→
BTh(p,
−→
L [
−→
R [min(n+ 1, N)]])
−
−→
BTh(p,
−→
L [
−→
R [min(n+ 2, N)]])
N
else
In the example of Table 3, p5 is imposed and
thus gets a 4.89 reward. All the providers con-
tribute to this reward. Notice also in both Table 2
and Table 3 that the mediator gets some money
left, which is of no use for it. This point is dis-
cussed later, in section 4.3.
Table 3: SBMediation: an imposition case
ω = 0.5 ; n = 2
4.2. The Providers’ Bidding Strategies
We now discuss the way in which a provider
works out its bids to perform queries. A simple
way to do so, is that each provider maintains a
billing rate for its resources based on its prefer-
ences to perform queries. Then, a provider’s bid
to perform an incoming query may be the product
of the estimated amount of resources required to
perform such a query by the billing rate (such as
in [17]). In our case, the context of a provider is
more complex: we have to consider its preferences,
load, current satisfaction, and current money bal-
ance. So, a provider first works out its intention to
perform an given query q by considering its pref-
erences, Prfp(q) ∈ [−1..1], its utilization at that
time t, Up(t), and its current satisfaction. The sat-
isfaction considered by a provider to compute its
intention is based on its preferences as defined
in Section 3.2.2. Intuitively, on the one hand, a
provider can sometimes accept queries it does not
want if it is satisfied. On the other hand, a provider
does not pay so much consideration to its utiliza-
tion and focuses on its preferences, to obtain de-
sired queries, if it is not satisfied. Then, a provider
computes its intention as follows [11].
PIp(q) =
˛˛
˛˛
˛˛
˛˛
(Prfp(q)
1−δs(p))(1− Up(t))
δs(p), ifPrfp(q) > 0
∧Up(t) < 1
−
`
(1− Prfp(q) + 1)
1−δs(p)×
×(Up(t) + 1)
δs(p)
´
otherwise
Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of function PI
when providers have a satisfaction value of 0.5
and 0. On the one hand, we observe that when
providers are satisfied of 0.5 (see Figure 1(a))
the providers’ preferences and utilization have
(a) for a provider’s satisfaction of 0.5 (b) for a provider’s satisfaction of 0
Figure 1: Tradeoff between preference and utilization for getting intention.
the same importance. On the other hand, when
providers are not satisfied at all (see Figure 1(b))
the providers’ utilization has no importance for
providers and their intentions are only defined by
their preferences.
Once a provider obtains its intention w.r.t. a
query, it then proceeds to work out its bid to per-
form such a query. Intuitively, the provider’s bid is
the product of its intention by its current money
balance. The current money balance of a provider
p is denoted by balp. Nonetheless, such a proce-
dure may lead a provider to spend all, or almost
all, its money on only one query. Thus, to avoid
such a behavior, a provider offers at most only a
pre-defined percent of its current money balance,
denoted by the constant 0 < c0 ≤ 1. We formally
define the providers’ bid in Definition 13, where
constant c1 is set to the initial money balance of
a provider.
Definition 13 Provider’s Bid
Bp(q) =
∣∣∣∣ PIp(q) · balp · c0 if PIp(q) > 0PIp(q) · c1 otherwise
The idea behind the above definition is that a
provider always sets positive bids when it desires
to perform queries and it is not overutilized, other-
wise it sets a negative bid. This allows a provider
to preserve its preferences and computational re-
sources while good response times are also ensured
to consumers.
4.3. The Flow of Money
In the whole system, in particular in the medi-
ation, the money used is purely virtual. We could
speak of tokens or jetons as well. This point has
to be stressed upon for two main reasons. First,
it underlines the fact that we do not focus on any
particular business model. We only use the vir-
tual money as a means to regulate the query al-
location in the system. Later, after it has decided
which providers it chooses, the consumer might
give real money to them, because it uses their ser-
vices. This point is far beyond the focus of this
paper, which concern is the query allocation prob-
lem. Second, when using real money, one can as-
sume that participants get money from elsewhere.
For example, when designing an auction mecha-
nism for e-commerce one can assume that people
spend the money they have earned by working (in
real life). When dealing with the virtual money of
a system, one can no longer make such assump-
tions. In our case, for the system to be correctly
regulated, we have to make precise the way money
circulates within it. There are several possibilities,
but we describe the choices that have been imple-
mented for the validation.
The system is composed of consumers,
providers and the mediator which implements
the mediation process. The consumers do not use
the virtual money, as they directly show their
intentions. The providers spend and earn money
through the mediator only. They spend money by
bidding on queries at the mediator’s. They also
Table 4: Money balance along a sequence of medi-
ations
ω = 0.5 ; n = 2
spend money to compensate other providers that
have been imposed by the mediation process.
They earn money when they are imposed by
the process. As for the mediator, it has been
shown [6], that with the type of mediation process
defined, the mediator never looses money. It even
tends to accumulate money coming from the
providers in the course of time, thus making the
providers poorer and poorer. This could distort
the mediation process or even block the system
when the providers no longer have money. A
simple solution has been adopted: the mediator
regularly redistributes the money it piles up
to the providers, in a equitable way. From the
providers’ point of view, it is another, regular,
way of earning money.
Table 4 illustrates the flow of money along a
sequence of five mediations followed by redistri-
bution of money by the mediator. At the initia-
tion step, we quote the providers’ and mediator’s
initial money balance (σ), and the consumer’s in-
tentions w.r.t. the providers (which we assume are
constant across these five mediations). Then, for
each provider and each query, we quote the bid
(B), those which are allocated the query (∗) and
the new money balance (σ). Each time there is a
change in provider’s money balance (respectively
of the mediator), the new value is in bold face.
Notice that the allocation of q3 is neither a com-
petition nor an imposition, thus there is no change
in the money balances. After the five mediations,
the mediator distributes the money it has piled up
(15.99) among the five providers.
4.4. Communication Cost
We analyze communication cost in terms of
number of messages that should be transferred
over the network to perform a query. The
SBMediation’s communication cost is given by
the following theorem where ni is the number of
imposed providers.
Theorem 1 The total number of transferred mes-
sages, Mssg, by SBMediation to perform a query
is Mssg = 3(N+1)+n for a competition case and
Mssg = 4N + ni + 3 for an imposition case.
Proof 1 Given a query q and the set Pq of
providers, mediator m first asks for q.c’s inten-
tion and Pq’s bids, which return such an informa-
tion to m. The number of exchanged messages at
this moment is mssg0 = 2N + 2. Once m receives
the participants’ interests, it computes the Pq’s
level as defined in Section 4.1.1 and ranks them
w.r.t. to their level. The complexity of evaluation
phase is O(N log2(N)). Having done this, m in-
forms all Pq providers of the mediation result and
waits for results from the n selected providers. The
number of transferred messages in this phase is
mssg1 = N +n. When an imposition case occurs,
mssg∗1 = N −n+ni more messages are exchanged
since all providers pay an amount of money to m,
which gives an award to the ni imposed providers.
Finally, m sends the results to c, which implies
mssg2 = 1 exchanged messages. Therefore, for
a competition case, Mssg = mssg0 + mssg1 +
mssg2 = 3(N + 1) + n, and for an imposition
case, Mssg = mssg0 +mssg1 +mssg
∗
1 +mssg2 =
4N + ni + 3.
We can reduce the number of transferred messages
by using participants’ representatives [6], but the
problem of reducing communication cost is orthog-
onal to the problem we address in this paper.
5. Validation
Our main objective is to evaluate, from a satis-
faction point of view, how well SBMediation op-
erates with autonomous providers.
5.1. Setup
We built a Java-based simulator which models
a mono-mediator distributed information system
following the mediation system architecture pre-
sented in [6]. We compare the SBMediation pro-
cess to Capacity based one [8, 15], which is a well-
known approach, in distributed information sys-
tems, to balance queries among providers. Capa-
city based allocates queries to those providers that
have the most available capacity amongst the set
Pq of providers. For SBMediation we set ω = 0.5,
which means that the consumers’ and providers’
interests are given the same importance for allo-
cating queries. For both query allocation meth-
ods, the following configuration (Table 5) is the
same and the only thing that changes is the way
in which each method allocates the queries.
In all the experimentations, the number of con-
sumer and provider sites is 200 and 400 respec-
tively. Queries arrive to the system in a Poisson
distribution. Consumers and providers are initial-
ized with a satisfaction value of 0.5, and a satis-
faction size2 of 200 and 500 respectively. For each
incoming query q, we randomly obtain q.n between
1 and 3. Since our main focus is to validate the way
in which queries are allocated, we do not consider
the bandwidth problem in this work.
For our experiments, we set the heterogene-
ity of the providers’ capacity in accordance to
the results in [14]. We generate around 10%
of low-capacity, 60% of medium-capacity, and
30% of high-capacity providers. The high-capacity
providers are 3 times more capable than medium-
capacity providers and still 7 times more capable
than low-capacity ones. We generate two classes
of query that consume, respectively, 130 and 150
treatment units at the high-capacity providers (i.e.
2 Which denotes the k last issued queries by consumers
and the ||SQkp || last treated queries by providers, respec-
tively.
Table 5: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Definition Value
nbConsumers Number of consumers 200
nbProviders Number of providers 400
nbMediators Number of mediators 1
qDistribution Query arrival distribution Poisson
iniSatisfaction Initial satisfaction 0.5
conSatSize k last issued queries 200
proSatSize k last treated queries 500
nbRepeat Repetition of simulations 10
1.3 and 1.5 seconds respectively). In our experi-
ments, the consumer’s preferences denote their in-
tentions, while the provider’s intentions are com-
puted as defined in Section 4.2. To simulate high
autonomy in our experiments, we randomly ob-
tain the consumers’ preferences between 0 and 1,
and the providers’ preferences between −1 and 1.
More sophisticated mechanisms for obtaining such
preferences can be applied (e.g. using the TCL or
Rush language), but it is beyond the scope of this
paper. We assume that providers decide to leave
the system if they are satisfied by 0.3 less than
their adequation (given our simulation setup, the
system’s adequation w.r.t. providers is 0.5).
5.2. Results
We analyze SBMediation from three points of
view: QLB, satisfaction balance, and performance.
The results, for QLB, presented here are for a
workload of 10% (at the beginning of the simu-
lation) increasing to 100%. Concerning QLB, we
observed that, for workloads from 10% to 60% of
the total system capacity (i.e. the aggregate ca-
pacity of all providers) SBMediation approach
is under, and so worse than Capacity based one
(see Figure 2(a)). Nonetheless, we observed that,
for workloads from 60% to 100% of the total sys-
tem capacity, SBMediation almost ensures the
same query load balance than Capacity based.
This is because, for high workloads, providers start
to pay more attention to their utilization than to
their preferences. Moreover, we observed that, for
query arrival rates from 10% to 40% of the to-
tal system capacity, providers suffers from query
starvation with Capacity based. This is because
(a) Query load balance (b) Consumers’ satisfaction for a
query load of 100%
(c) Providers’ satisfaction for a query
load of 100%
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Figure 2: Satisfaction and performance results.
the most capable providers monopolize queries.
Since SBMediation considers their satisfaction,
no provider monopolizes queries. The next re-
sults show that things are still much better for
SBMediation.
Concerning satisfaction, we observed through
our experiments that participants’ satisfaction is
almost the same for different query arrival rates
(from 10% to 100% of the total system capac-
ity). By this fact, we only present the satisfac-
tion results for a query arrival rate of 100% of
the total system capacity. Consumers can ob-
serve that Capacity based is neutral (because
their satisfaction is equal to their adequation), but
they benefit from paid attention to their inten-
tions by SBMediation (see Figure 2(b)). In fact,
SBMediation gives always better satisfaction to
consumers than Capacity based because Capaci-
ty based proceeds in a blind way as far as this
point is concerned. On the other side, while Capa-
city based satisfies providers under their adequa-
tion, SBMediation satisfies them almost all the
time over their adequation (see Figure 2(c)). This
means that SBMediation gives, in average, inter-
esting queries to providers and that Capacity ba-
sed punishes them with uninteresting ones. Notice
that, the values of the providers’ satisfaction suffer
from greater oscillations than those of consumers,
because of natural competition of providers for
performing queries.
Now, we proceed to study the impact on per-
formance of the providers’ autonomy. We can ob-
serve in Figure 2(d) that while Capacity based
looses in average 60% of providers for all query
arrival rates, SBMediation looses only a 27% of
providers! Indeed, such provider’s departures are
reflected on the ensured response time3. To bet-
ter illustrate the departures impact, we show in
Figure 2(e) the response times ensured by both
SBMediation and Capacity based when partici-
pants are captive, i.e. they do not leave the sys-
tem by dissatisfaction. As expected, Capacity ba-
sed is better than SBMediation in captive en-
vironments, but things are not the same when
confronted to autonomous participants (see Fig-
ure 2(f)). We observed that while SBMediation
3 As is conventional, it is defined as the elapsed time from
the moment that a query q is issued to the moment that
the q.c site receives the response of q.
degrades its performance only by a factor of 1.3,
Capacity based does it by a factor of 4! Therefore,
SBMediation can scale up in such environments
while Capacity based cannot.
All above results demonstrate the great superi-
ority, in all the cases, of SBMediation against the
Capacity based when confronted to autonomous
participants.
6. Related Work
In the context of large distributed information
systems, the problem of balancing queries while
respecting the participants’ expectations has not
received much attention and is still an open prob-
lem. Most of the work on query load balancing
[8, 15] has only dealt with the problem of mini-
mizing providers’ utilization.
Several solutions [2, 5, 17] strive to deal with
such intentions in query allocations by means of
economical models. Mariposa [17] pioneered the
use of a market approach for dealing with the
query allocation problem. Nevertheless, its query
allocation procedure is simple and limited. Con-
sumers cannot freely express their intentions since
it is inherently assumed that they are just in-
terested in response times and low prices for ac-
quiring services. Furthermore, some queries may
not get processed although relevant providers ex-
ist and it is unclear how this technique really en-
sures theQLB in the system. A survey of economic
models for various aspects of distributed system
is presented in [4]. The notion of utility is clearly
linked to satisfaction. However, it is generally re-
duced to monetary concerns only. Most of the pro-
cesses that are proposed in the field of distributed
rational decision making [13] are individually ra-
tional: the utility of any participant in the process
is no less than the utility it would have by not
participating. This property is not relevant in co-
operative contexts where some participants may
be imposed, which implies having a lower utility
in participating. Thus, satisfaction is still relevant
in such contexts because it is a long-run notion.
Auctions are widely recognized as a way to man-
age negotiation among participants. Several kinds
of auction mechanisms exist [13, 20]. In the purely
competitive case our work looks like this gener-
alized Vickrey auction, but it pushes generaliza-
tion further because it takes into account the con-
sumer’s intention factor via ranking and theoret-
ical bid. Multi-attribute auctions [3, 19] are an-
other kind of generalization, which help finding
goods providers, without considering requisition.
Imposition occurs any time a participant is re-
quired to perform a query that it does not want
to. The basic idea of fair imposition [16] is that all
the participants must support the imposed one.
The problem is tackled from a purely economi-
cal point of view, each participant sending its cost
to perform the task. Fairness is obtained because
the invoicing asks all participants to pay the same
amount and gives a compensation to the imposed
one. In SBMediation, the requisition case gen-
eralizes the fair imposition mechanism, with the
notion of consumer’s intention and to n selected
providers.
In our proposal presented in [11], the providers’
intention is already considered, but the con-
sumers’ one does not. In [12], we proposed a set
of strategies for balancing queries considering such
intentions. The work [12] is complementary to the
contributions of this paper. One can apply, for ex-
ample, such strategies before performing the query
allocation process proposed in this work.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the query alloca-
tion problem in distributed information systems
from a new point of view, by considering not only
query load but also participants’ satisfaction. To
our knowledge, this is the first work that stud-
ies this problem in its whole generality. Our work
brings several contributions.
First, we proposed a complete model that char-
acterizes the participants’ interests for allocating
and performing queries. These definitions are orig-
inal, considering long-run notions: adequation and
satisfaction. They are independent of how the par-
ticipants’ intentions are computed and how the
mediation process considers them. The proposed
model was designed to be general, and thus, can
be used for any distributed system architecture.
Second, we propose a mediation process, called
SBMediation, that considers consumers’ inten-
tions and providers’ bids to allocate queries. We
discussed how query allocation and invoicing steps
leads to participants’ satisfaction. The originality
of SBMediation is to satisfy both participants’
expectations and query demand.
Third, we evaluated and compared, through
experimentation, the behavior of SBMediation
against Capacity based. We demonstrated that
SBMediation significantly outperforms Capa-
city based. We discussed that Capacity ba-
sed suffers from query starvation problems for
low query arrival rates while SBMediation does
not. We showed that participants are, in gen-
eral, very satisfied with SBMediation. This is
not the case for Capacity based which suffers
from several providers’ departures due to dissat-
isfaction. Furthermore, the results demonstrate
that SBMediation can scale up in these sys-
tems while Capacity based cannot. Finally, since
SBMediation considers the consumers’ inten-
tions and providers’ bid without any consideration
about how they are computed, it is self-adaptable
to the changes in their expectations.
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